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Reinhold Elges (Potsdam)
International Statebuilding – Time to
Reconsider
Um aktuelle Ansätze international induzierter Staatsbildung besser zu verstehen, sollten die zentralen
Konzepte, auf welchen sich diese Praktiken gründen, erneut untersucht werden. Zerlegt man Staatsbildung
in ihre Einzelkomponenten, so zeigt sich die enorme Weite des Feldes, und schließlich die Notwendigkeit,
gängige Praktiken der Internationalen Gemeinschaft zu hinterfragen. Staatsbildung bedeutet im Grunde
Institutionen zu entwickeln, welche die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft regeln. Institutionen
bestehen nicht nur aus formalen Regelsystemen, sondern ebenso aus informellen Normen und wie beide
angewandt und durchgesetzt werden. Dies wirkt sich auf die Transferierbarkeit von Institutionen aus. Der
vorliegende Beitrag schließt, dass dem Ziel der Staatsbildung mehr durch eine Betonung der Prozesse
institutioneller Entwicklung gedient ist, als durch die Auferlegung vorgefertigter ‚Lösungen‘. Der Prozess
der lokalen Problemlösung durch neue Staatsstrukturen, wie fehlerhaft und ineffektiv er auch erscheint,
ist Grundvoraussetzung für dauerhaften Wandel.
Keywords: International Transitional Administration, State-building, New Institutionalism, process
orientation, State-in-Society Approach, Balkan/Bosnia
Internationale Übergangsadministration, Staatsbildung, Neo-Institutionalismus,
Prozeßorientierung, “State-in-Society” Ansatz, Balkan/Bosnien
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP), 34 Jg. (2005) H. 2,  177–189
1. Introduction
This article’s primary concern is to discuss
the practice of setting up international transi-
tional administrations in post-conflict societies
for the purpose of statebuilding. It proposes that
disaggregating this project and looking anew at
its various components – its end (the state), the
process (statebuilding), the agents and subjects
of change (actors) and the vehicle (institutions)
– reveals not only its immense scope but also
the need to revisit current practices. It under-
scores that institutional development is a lengthy
and complicated process defying quick solu-
tions. The article questions reformist and criti-
cally optimistic approaches to post-conflict re-
construction that dominate the literature and
seem to take for granted a “try again, fail again,
fail better” method to international interventions
(Cramer/Goodhand 2002). It challenges the fun-
damentally positivist assumption that the basic
concepts are right and only implementation
needs improvement. Revisiting those concepts
that underlie models of political development
in post-conflict societies might be a starting
point for further research and, ultimately, better
practices.
Focusing largely on operational specifics of
peace- and statebuilding missions, current ap-
proaches tend to neglect the role that such op-
erations play with regard to the export of cer-
tain norms and models of political institutions
(Paris 2002). Static concepts of the state as a
unitary and autonomous organization obstruct
the view on the dynamics of post-conflict
statebuilding processes. Similarly, international
interventions have focused on targets (e.g. an
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“independent judiciary”) without properly un-
derstanding the processes leading there
(Ottaway 2002, 1009).
A dynamic definition of the state is essen-
tial for the study of statebuilding and the poten-
tial role of the international community in such
processes. The new institutionalisms in social
science have developed approaches that help to
understand actors and structures and can stimu-
late new analyses of war to peace transitions.
They provide the basis for this discussion of
institutional change. The final section applies
insights from the theoretical discussion to some
recent experiences in externally driven
statebuilding missions.
2. What is at stake in international
statebuilding?
State- and peacebuilding concepts have be-
come increasingly complex. Best practice and
lessons learned exercises have resulted in highly
multifaceted, costly, and time consuming recon-
struction concepts. Yet increased comprehensive-
ness is often frustrated by impasses during im-
plementation. Practitioners and scholars have
thus turned to international transitional admin-
istration to lead the process of transition from
war to peace through statebuilding. But interna-
tional transitional administration and state-
building are both highly complex, probably
among the most difficult tasks a nation or inter-
national organization can undertake, as the record
of such attempts exemplifies (Caplan 2002;
Etzioni 2004). Even unsurpassed military power
and extraordinary resources cannot ensure mas-
tering the challenge of such complexity, much
less produce quick results (Pei/Kasper 2003).
Complexity is two-fold: The environments
that the international community faces are best
captured as “complex political emergencies,”1
that have multiple and interconnected causes,
courses, and consequences. Each case is unique,
yet with state collapse or state failure complex
political emergencies share an important char-
acteristic (Spanger 2002, 4). The international
community is also a highly complex actor. More
accurately, the international community is a sys-
tem comprising multiple actors, and thus vari-
ous interests, agendas, and strategies that are not
necessarily complementary. Both dimensions
cumulate in the context of externally driven
post-conflict statebuilding, increasing the com-
plexity.
2.1. Statebuilding and the Modern State
Before we can discuss statebuilding, we need
to define the state. Taking Weber’s (1946, 78)
classic definition as a starting point, the state is
“a human community that (successfully) claims
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory.” This entails con-
ceptions of state-society relations that are po-
tentially conflicting. The state needs autonomy
from society to be operational. The level of state
efficiency and its decision-making capacity are
linked to the degree of state autonomy. More
autonomy leads to an increase in both efficiency
and decision making capacity. Yet, conversely,
the degree of states’ governance abilities and
legitimacy depends on how deeply they are an-
chored in society (Spanger 2002, 10f.). This re-
lationship is not static but interactive (Jackson/
Nexon 1999). This suggests that the state is not
standing a priori over and above society, but
should rather be understood as a state-in-soci-
ety (Migdal 2001).
Following the state-in-society approach
avoids focusing the analysis of the state solely
on the central state institutions which tends to
attribute extensive abilities to the state to en-
force its will on society, underestimating in turn
the effect of society on the state (Manning 2003,
29). Migdal (2001, 16) alternatively defines the
state as a “field of power marked by the use and
threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image
of a coherent, controlling organization in a ter-
ritory, which is a representation of the people
bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual prac-
tices of its multiple parts.”
This definition of the state has two essential
features: it disaggregates the state into its dif-
ferent parts and recognizes their interaction (for
instance along the vertical or horizontal dimen-
sion, such as central vs. local, or among differ-
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ent administrative departments); and it consid-
ers states as embedded in society, as distinct
organizations within societies among numerous
others (Evans 1995). Thus it addresses the para-
dox that the state is simultaneously apart from
society and a part of society that is inherent in
Weber’s definition. Neither can states transform
societies sufficiently to solve this dilemma nor
vice versa. Rather, both states and societies
transform each other and are thus mutually con-
stitutive. Migdal (2001, 263) therefore speaks
of the “limited state”.
At the heart of statebuilding is the struggle
for legitimacy. In the classic approach to the
state, legitimacy is the basis for the reproduc-
tion of the “relations of rule” that ensures the
survival of the state as a functional unit. The
“limited state” approach broadens the perspec-
tive by locating this struggle in multiple arenas,
both inside the state and in state-society junc-
tions. Legitimacy serves to maintain the “im-
age” of the state and derives directly or indi-
rectly from the “practices of its multiple parts,”
which can either consolidate or create rifts in
the image. Whereas maintaining legitimacy as-
sures the survival of the state, gaining legitimacy
is at the heart of statebuilding.
Scharpf (1999) and others have identified
two ways for the creation and maintenance of
legitimacy: “input legitimacy” and “output le-
gitimacy”. “Input legitimacy” draws on a
commonality among the citizenry together with
the belief that the existence of the state is “right”.
Weber’s ideal types of authority (traditional,
charismatic, and rational-legal) provide useful
concepts of various sources of this belief. De-
spite their different characteristics, all three con-
cepts rest on the relationship between leaders
and followers. The leader (state) derives his role
from the belief his followers have about his
mission. In democracies, input legitimacy is re-
alized through popular participation and repre-
sentation (Peterson/Shackleton 2002, 356). The
standard strategy to provide it in post-conflict
situations is to create a power sharing mecha-
nism that gives the warring factions a stake in
government at least on paper.
“Output legitimacy” relates to the general
effectiveness of the state in dealing with prob-
lems and generating policy outputs. The state
can gain legitimacy on the output side through
the provision of public goods and services
(welfarism) or by welfare enhancing interven-
tions (utilitarism). Only if citizens identify the
state as the provider for public goods does the
state gain legitimacy (Stauffer 1999). Post-con-
flict governments lack the resources to provide
such services and are thus largely dependent on
the international community. While the inflow
of resources and services is important for alle-
viation of human suffering, it can also create
dilemmas and obstacles to the development of
the state.
The state is thus a multidimensional actor
embedded in society. Both state maintenance
and statebuilding depend on legitimacy. For the
state to be legitimate in the eyes of the citizens,
it must be authoritative and have the capacity to
make and enforce decisions. The process of
statebuilding, then, is a struggle for state domi-
nance over society to make and enforce the rules
that govern society.
Since the state is no unitary and completely
autonomous actor, this struggle comprises con-
flicts between the state and other social actors,
and between the different parts of the state, oc-
curring in multiple arenas (Manning 2003,
29ff.). In order to understand the dynamics of
post-conflict statebuilding, we have to turn to
the driving forces of these processes. We have
to understand the actors and the interests that
clash during statebuilding and the institutions
that structure these processes.
2.2. The relevance of actors and institutions
Statebuilding conflicts involve myriad ac-
tors and changing coalitions of (individual or
corporate) actors, like interest, or ethnic / iden-
tity groups. The goal of post-conflict state-
building is to change the behavior of actors from
hostility to cooperation and accommodation of
conflicting interests. Actors have to form po-
litical units that enable them to settle their con-
flicts in non-violent ways. It is widely assumed
that the most effective and enduring way to do
so is to build a state.
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Historically, statebuilding processes reach
over an extensive time span. Post-conflict
statebuilding is commonly understood as accel-
erated state formation through external assist-
ance, i.e. security, money, and technical knowl-
edge. Yet, as Miliken and Krause (2002)  note,
one can only expect such success if the state is
taken completely out of its historical context,
an institutional form independent from the his-
torical forces that created it. These concepts have
proven problematic in the context of moderni-
zation theory and there is little to suggest that
this should be different in post-conflict contexts.
The state is more than an organizational con-
struct. Actors and structures are also relevant
for the character and viability of states.
2.2.1. Actors
Analyzing the behavior of actors requires
understanding how they make decisions. Re-
fraining from an exhausting discussion of ac-
tors, we shall simply indicate that actors are
complex entities whose decision making and
preference formation are not to be treated
exogenously, as much of the post-conflict lit-
erature does.2
Preferences derive from actors’ interests and
identities. When trying to understand actor
behavior, we can treat either one as endogenous
or exogenous (Fearon 2002). This article treats
them as endogenous since we are interested in
understanding how actors change their behavior
from violent confrontation to peaceful coopera-
tion under a state order. Treating preferences as
given would render prospects for such devel-
opment bleak. The preference-action link resem-
bles a two-step model that helps to understand
why actors cooperate: first we explain prefer-
ence formation, then we explain interaction be-
tween actors that leads to an outcome (e.g. co-
operation) . The discussion of institutions sug-
gests that this is not a one way street: the pref-
erences of actors might result from their inter-
action. The two-step model is in fact an endless
dance, with preferences leading to action/inter-
action, which in turn leads to new or consoli-
dated preferences.
Treating preferences (interests and identities)
as endogenous requires a conception of their
origin and potential change. Multiple actors in-
teracting in complex and dynamic networks
complicate the study of agency. Yet agency is
not only actor dependent. In fact, most social
science accepts that while actors conceived as
purposeful agents have an impact on society,
they are simultaneously affected by that society
(Wendt 1987, 337f.). Thus, agency can at least
partly be explained via social structures, the in-
stitutions in a society.3
2.2.2. Institutions
Statebuilding is often referred to as institu-
tion building, or institutional design/engineer-
ing (Bastian/Luckham 2003) but institutions are
mostly taken for granted. Unfortunately, “insti-
tution, too, is a complicated concept” (Ottaway
2002). Merriam-Webster defines institution as
“a significant practice, relationship, or organi-
zation in a society or culture […] an established
organization or corporation especially of a pub-
lic character.” Two qualities, “significant” and
“established”, are particularly important (Ba-
karat/Chard 2002, 818). Structures, like inter-
ests and identities, can also be differentiated as
exogenous and endogenous: The former impact
on actors in the sense of physical constraints
(Fearon 2002, 65ff.). The latter poses cognitive
constraints and are the subject of the discussion
below.
Social structures are systems of beliefs and
practices (Fearon 2002, 65). Following Wendt
(1992, 399) belief systems (collective know-
ledge) and related actions of individuals con-
struct social structures: shared belief systems
entail shared assumptions about possible actions
of others upon which decisions about actions
are made. Thus, actors and endogenous struc-
tures are mutually constitutive. Institutions are
relatively stable (“established”) sets or “struc-
tures” of identities and interests. They can be
codified in formal rules and norms and are fun-
damentally cognitive entities but they act on in-
dividuals as more or less coercive social facts.
Identities and such collective cognitions do not
International Statebuilding – Time to Reconsider 181
exist apart from each other; they are also “mu-
tually constitutive.” Institutionalization is a proc-
ess of internalizing new identities and interests,
not something occurring outside them and af-
fecting only behavior. Socialization is a cogni-
tive process, not just a behavioral one.
This concept of institutions is not limited to
sociological institutionalism. North’s (2003, 9)
“institutional order” is a combination of formal
rules (constitutions, laws, organizations), infor-
mal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions,
codes of conduct, ‘culture’), and their enforce-
ment characteristics (law enforcement, social
pressure to comply) which determine the effec-
tiveness of the institutional order to shape actor
behavior. March and Olson (1998, 948) explain
institutions similarly as “relatively stable col-
lections of practices and rules defining appro-
priate behavior for specific groups of actors in
specific situations.” All these perspectives de-
fine institutions as a function of rules, norms
and practices (behavior or enforcement mecha-
nisms). They go beyond neo-classic economics
approaches that treat institutions as politically
determined rules that are introduced top-down
on actors and constrain their behavior like physi-
cal constraints. The traditional institutions-as-
rules perspective is of limited value for interna-
tional statebuilding since treating institutions
only as formal rules presumes a functioning and
authoritative state that can enforce them effec-
tively (Greif forthcoming).
We can summarize that all actions, events,
and outcomes in the social world result from
agency. Agency in turn hinges on concrete his-
torical contexts that condition the possibilities
for action and influence its course. Any analy-
sis of social action has to account for both, the
power of agents and the relevance of structures,
that condition action. So does international state-
building.4  The discussion of institutions suggests
that the international community does not build
institutions in a post-conflict situations, but or-
ganizations, which need to be made “significant
and established” by the domestic actors them-
selves (Ottaway 2002). The following section
examines how institutions change, proposing
that statebuilding is essentially about transform-
ing or replacing institutions in a society.
2.2.3. Institutional change
Wendt identifies two ways of institutional
change that are relevant for the discussion on
how post-conflict situations can (or cannot) be
transformed: institutions change either uninten-
tionally through evolution of practice, or inten-
tionally, as a consequence of self-reflection, a
conscious choice by actors to transform their
roles and identities. The latter has at least two
prerequisites: Actors must have a reason to think
of themselves in different ways, such as facing
new social contents unmanageable by traditional
self-conceptions. And the rewards of role change
must be greater than the costs (Wendt 1992,
419).
Applying this to a post-conflict situation
might elucidate the complexity of such change.5
In order advance inter-group cooperation
through self-reflected change, a group (A)
would have to disagree internally on a held con-
sensus (collective knowledge) about the other
group (B) in a conflict. This consensus could
be the belief of A’s leadership that B is by de-
fault hostile and thus not to be trusted. In a sec-
ond stage, A would have to examine what
among its own practices in the past might have
caused B to engage in hostile behavior, like
political extremism and exclusiveness on A’s
side.
This critical reflection of A and the acknowl-
edgment that A itself has contributed to insecu-
rity and thus the hostility of B would enable A
to seek a change in its own behavior in order to
change the image that B has of A. Thus A would
try to change B by changing itself (i.e. A tries
to induce change in B by complicating B’s im-
age of A and thus breaking the consensual im-
age of A among members of B). In our setting,
A could engage unilaterally in new practices that
display goodwill, such as demilitarization of its
members. Yet, in order for such unilateral moves
to build up a regime of cooperation, B must “re-
ward” A’s behavior (by reacting likewise) in
order to encourage a continuation of A’s new
practices. Stable practice of a regime of coop-
eration could lead to its institutionalization.
Post-conflict situations present significant
obstacles for such a four-step sequence. More
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than two parties to the conflict would add more
variables, thus discouraging unilateral actions.
Self-reflection might not occur due to persist-
ent convictions of the parties. Expectations
about linear causal mechanisms are thus prob-
lematic: behavior and concepts of self and other
do not change automatically upon changes in
the physical environment. But assumptions
about such mechanic processes often underlie
approaches to post-conflict environments: se-
curity guarantees for peace agreements, support
for government structures, money and training
are expected to stimulate change but often re-
sult in disappointment.
Unintended change can result from evolu-
tion of cooperation. Behavior creates expecta-
tions which affect actors’ identities and inter-
ests. Through cooperation, actors form new ex-
pectations about future actions by others, which
after relatively stable practice over time leads
to the internalization of new norms, e.g. valu-
ing cooperation in itself, not only because it
yields better returns than unilateral behavior.
Two obstacles stand in the way of the change
through evolution of practice model.
First, actors have to start cooperation. There-
fore they must be interested in absolute rather
than relative gains. The latter would be the re-
sult of negative attitudes like antipathy and dis-
trust toward each other. In our post-conflict set-
ting, groups A and B could prefer relative (sub-
optimal) gains such as securing the group’s de-
cision making autonomy over absolute gains like
an increase in collective security or prosperity
from cooperation. Even if the international com-
munity can facilitate the beginning of coopera-
tive processes (e.g. through roundtables) they
will not become established and relevant, i.e.
institutionalized, until the actors have internal-
ized them.
Secondly, change through evolution of prac-
tice is slow and incremental. Wendt (1992, 418)
explains that change is not the primary objec-
tive of the actors concerned, but rather a
byproduct of attempts to realize other goals. It
might thus take a long time of cooperation be-
tween actors before cooperation and the will-
ingness to compromise – prerequisites for the
functioning of democratic processes – are
realized as values in their own right (as opposed
to necessary evils). Warring parties can be
forced to cooperate in democratic structures
under an international transitional administra-
tion, yet until this cooperation is valued itself
and thus considered appropriate by the domes-
tic actors, it cannot be self-sustainable. Deter-
mining when internalization has taken place is
impossible ex ante, difficult ex post, and most
likely longsome due to institutions’ path-de-
pendence.
We can summarize institutional change from
a sociological institutionalism perspective refer-
ring to the concepts of the logic of appropriate-
ness versus the logic of consequences (or in-
strumentality). Following the former means that
actors make decisions because they are widely
valued within a broader cultural environment
(Hall/Taylor 1996, 949). The logic of conse-
quences suggests that actors follow rational
means-ends calculations, while the former sug-
gests that what is considered rational is socially
determined, and thus decisions are eventually
made on reflections about appropriateness.6  The
legitimacy of institutions, then, depends on the
sources of cultural authority.
Without trying to locate the origins of cul-
ture, it is clear that successful statebuilding in-
volves much more than the creation of govern-
ance systems. Likewise, institution-building
does not mean changing the formal structure,
the written ‘rules of the game’. Rather it is about
aligning formal rules with informal norms, and
monitoring the enforcement or practice of each.
Institutional performance depends on the inter-
play of these components and does not result
from the existence of just one of them.
A lack of appreciation for the complexity
of the above mentioned concepts has hampered
most approaches to international transitional
administration and statebuilding and their
evaluations. While the goals of statebuilding
missions are easily identifiable, the means how
to get there are not. More recently, a new thread
in the literature has emerged that questions tra-
ditional thinking on peace implementation.
Such approaches combine insights from devel-
opment theory and apply them to post-conflict
situations.
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3. International Statebuilding – The need
to reconsider
3.1.From Peacekeeping to International
Statebuilding
Alongside the “new interventionism”  (May-
all 1996) exercised by the international com-
munity in post-conflict situations, publications
mushroomed on all aspects of civil conflict,
peacemaking, –keeping, and –building, as well
as reconstruction. The majority of the literature
focuses on the role and impact of external in-
volvement in post-conflict situations. The fol-
lowing section provides an eclectic critique of
the problems inherent in the current approaches
to international statebuilding based on the fore-
going discussion.
Chopra (1999, 34) gave a candid assessment
of the state of affairs in 1999: “Peace operations
to date have expected too much too quickly.
Internal, national consolidation has been antici-
pated as a result of a single, relatively short, tran-
sitional phase. It has amounted to a ‘quick-fix’
worldview. Capitalism, democracy and the in-
stitutions of Western, liberal-style states have
been the measurement of instant-development.”
A 2005 perspective, especially in light of the
recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
reveals that not much has changed: traditional
approaches prevail and lessons learned remain
largely on paper.
These approaches can be divided into de-
ductive and inductive approaches (Cousens et
al. 2001, 5-10). The former deduce the content
of peacebuilding from the existing capacities
and mandates of international agencies and or-
ganizations. Identification of potential compo-
nents is largely based on conceptual landmarks
that informed decision makers like the UN
Agendas for Peace and later the Brahimi Re-
port. The bulk of the literature focuses on the
operational implications of the implementation
of the various components.7  Important advances
have been made, for instance that peacebuilding
is fundamentally political and not impartial,
technical assistance. But the focus has remained
on mechanics and techniques to address the
challenges, reflecting the positivist thinking that
ultimately underlies deductive approaches. Fine
tuning the tools has proven inadequate to ad-
dress dynamic contexts not least because it does
not clarify when and under what conditions they
might be responsibly and effectively deployed
(Cousens et al. 2001, 8). Nevertheless, deduc-
tive approaches have been most influential in
post-conflict reconstruction strategies.
Inductive approaches are problem driven.
They focus on the structural causes of the con-
flicts and the resulting ‘needs matrix’, aiming to
tailor solutions to specific cases. Among the im-
portant insights of this school are that blueprints
for external assistance are not likely work due
to the differences of the cases and that the inter-
national intervention itself can play a distorting
role. However, causal analysis is often only pos-
sible in retrospect and thus ill suited for future
planning. Identifying root causes of conflicts
does not necessarily explain their relative post-
conflict relevance. Nor does it advise how solv-
ing one problem might affect others. Such know-
ledge is crucial for effective sequencing of re-
construction measures and for avoiding unin-
tended consequences of interventions.
Both approaches have informed the latest
response to the challenge of building a lasting
peace in post-conflict societies, international
transitional administration. These missions are
a response to the ever growing complexity of
the “democratic reconstruction model” (Ottaway
2002) which requires states not only to settle
hostilities but to jumpstart a comprehensive re-
form agenda that aims at restructuring state-so-
ciety relationships according to internationally
accepted standards. Such endeavors have been
implemented in Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and East Timor during the 1990s. All
these missions had the ambition to bring lasting
peace to a country or region from which not only
the people affected by the conflict but the inter-
national community at large would benefit.
Statebuilding has been the central means to
achieve this end.
3.2. Lessons from Bosnia and Beyond
International administrations propose that
external statebuilding works, i.e. that it is pos-
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sible to establish the conditions for legitimate
and sustainable national governance through a
period of benevolent foreign autocracy.
Strikingly, this inherent contradiction has gained
little attention in scholarly literature and even
less in the relevant policy documents.8  Chester-
man (2004) calls this a means-ends incon-
sistency. Beauvais (2001, 1108) stresses prac-
tical implications, speaking of a dual state-
building mandate for UNTAET, including a
“UN governorship”9  and a “local self-govern-
ment” part.
Such contradictions, inconsistencies, or op-
erational challenges have triggered diverse re-
sponses: Chopra (2002, 999) calls for new con-
cepts he labels “participatory intervention;”
Chesterman (2004) advocates clear mandates,
detailed sequencing of power transfer to the lo-
cal population, transparency and accountabil-
ity of international staff. He insists that local
consent and true “ownership” of the process do
not go together with international transitional
administration, captiously pointing out that such
intervention would not be needed if governance
could rely on local actors; and for Caplan (2002,
83), power is the key, concluding “that a transi-
tional administration in possession of full ex-
ecutive, as opposed to supervisory, authority is
better equipped to meet the manifold challenge
of these operations.”
Two examples from Bosnia highlight the
practical problems that are symptomatic for the
contradictions in external statebuilding. First,
the idea of the Bosnian constitution as laid out
in the Dayton Agreement was that power shar-
ing would be the key to pacification. Relying
heavily on a consociational power sharing
mechanism, the country was soon stuck in a
deadlock because each nationality exploited its
prerogative to block decisions on the state level
that would hurt its “vital interests”. Frustrated
with the process, the Peace Implementation
Council empowered the High Representative
(HR) to push through legislation he considered
necessary for implementation of Dayton and
remove “obstructionists” to the peace process
from office. Although this moved the country
forward in some respect, it was detrimental to
the statebuilding exercise in general.
Local elites could use HR interventions to
prop up ethnic antagonism: they opposed the
decisions and exploited the authoritarian char-
acter for their identity narratives. Decisions
against individual politicians, for instance, were
transformed into assaults against the whole
ethnic group. Furthermore, the parties have
concentrated their power and attention to the
entity level. Avoiding decision making at the
national level is beneficial for the local elites,
since they can avoid association with unpopu-
lar decisions, which they would have to defend
before their constituencies. As the international
community wants to see smooth and progres-
sive development, the HR will finally make the
decisions.10  These in turn have a high propa-
ganda value, since local elites can declare their
solidarity with the population against interven-
tion from outsiders reinforcing the ties with their
communities.
Instead of institutionalizing the need for co-
operation into the local actors, HR intervention
thus strengthened the ethno-nationalist forces.
While those actors concentrated their political
activity on the entity level, HR intervention has
dominated political development at the state
level to the extent that the OHR has become an
essential part of the political system in Bosnia
(Cox 2004). This calls into question the pros-
pect of sustainability of the central state and the
legislation passed in its name.
A second example from Bosnia elucidates
the limited impact that electoral design, a cru-
cial component of statebuilding in Bosnia, has
in adversarial environments. The international
community sought “to use repeated elections at
various levels to diminish the power of the po-
litical parties which are seen as bearing a large
part of the responsibility for the war there, and
to encourage the emergence of ‘moderate’ al-
ternatives” (CSCE 1998, 1; Manning 2001, 3).
This strategy has failed, at least in the short term,
due to the power struggles along the election
process that used elections for factional agen-
das.
Manning (2001, 8) points to the core of the
problem: “Elections are not simply indicators
of the level of commitment to the political sys-
tem, they are tools used pro-actively by all ac-
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tors struggling to define the structure of the new
state of BiH and their own place within it.” Then
HR Carl Bildt (1996, 254) explains “for the
Serbs, elections were a way to sanction the sta-
tus quo, while for Muslims they were a way to
roll everything back to the pre-war status.” Such
behavior could and should have been foreseen
by the international community. Migdal’s defi-
nition of the state in society is a good lens to
capture these dynamics in post-conflict Bosnia.
Ideal-type, Weberian state models, combined
with rather mechanic expectations regarding
political processes, and calculating with
unidimensional actors and institutions all too
often miss the mark.
“Designing” a political system from the out-
side according to the perceived needs of a soci-
ety is hardly possible. Bosnia’s constitutional
framework, although designed and continuously
‘fine-tuned’ for the local context (Manning/
Antic 2003), has not resulted in a unified, peace-
ful, multi-ethnic Bosnian state. That state would
need supportive informal norm structures,
shared by the main political and social actors.
Returning to the need to rethink the concept
of institutions, and “institution building” in par-
ticular, the widely held assumption that
statebuilding (or institution building respec-
tively) has to “start from scratch”11  is problem-
atic. This is rarely the case. While some of this
might just be rhetoric, international approaches
often suggest a lack of reflection on the key
concepts employed. New institutions are intro-
duced into a world replete with institutions.
Following the approach to institutions and in-
stitutional change outlined above requires
abolishing prepackaged solutions to post-con-
flict societies and devoting more attention to the
recipients’ side.
Yet “starting from scratch” thinking per-
vades all policy areas in post-conflict situations:
from constitutional design over economic recon-
struction to “civil society” promotion. While it
is important to utilize remaining indigenous
structures for the purpose of facilitating recon-
struction, it is imperative to figure them into
efforts of political development. Informal norms
outlive even significant changes in the formal
structures of the political system and fill the
empty shells of formal rules with life. Formal-
istic institution-building is bound to produce
unintended consequences, meaning that actual
developments on the ground do not resemble
the intentions of the ‘designers’.
International intervention should thus be
directed at transforming the informal norms of
society to bring them in line with the require-
ments of the formal structures, instead of sim-
ply imposing the latter. Yet imposition is com-
mon procedure in the Bosnian statebuilding and
reform process. Examples abound, from secu-
rity sector reform, tax and other economic re-
forms, constitutional change, most of which are
aimed at removing obstacles on the way to the
EU: the international community has made the
bulk of the decisions, has appointed commis-
sions and organizations, passed laws, and re-
moved disagreeable people from elected or other
public office. But reforms have often not had
the intended effects. This is due to poor imple-
mentation which results from opposition, ob-
struction or corruption by local actors. Poor
implementation of reforms could prolong a situ-
ation in which the citizens have to suffer the cut
backs – for instance from economic reform or
public expenditure overhauls – without being
able to reap the benefits of a revitalized
economy, adding grievances to the still dire situ-
ation of the population instead of alleviating
them.
The fact that only severe outside pressure
has led to ‘changes’ calls their durability into
question. Without the committed involvement
of parliaments at entity or canton levels and true
internalization of reforms, set-backs are possi-
ble, if not likely. Mitra (2004) notes that domes-
tic political processes, however glacially slow,
are nevertheless necessary for the formation of
the consensus only upon which durable change
can be built. The emphasis, then, should be more
on strengthening domestic processes than on
imposing the ‘right’ solution.
There seems to be a growing willingness in
the donor community to reconsider the ap-
proaches of the 1990s. Much of this new think-
ing takes into account development literature
and experience. Post-conflict reconstruction it-
self has come to be regarded as a development
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challenge in the special circumstances of a war-
torn society (Stiefel 1999). This suggests that
current approaches may be improved by turn-
ing toward the lessons learned in development
cooperation (which can look back on a much
longer history of evaluation, adaptation and “try
again, fail again, fail better” excercises) and
combining those with the experiences made in
post-conflict situations.
Development and post-conflict strategies
remain inconsistent. Where one is process ori-
ented and seeks sustainability, the other is rather
product based and looks for results in short time;
while one is controlled externally, the other pro-
motes local initiative (Bush 2004). Attempts to
get these two “cultures” talking to each other
are manifested for instance in community
driven reconstruction programs (Cliffe et al.
2003). In general, greater appreciation for the
local context seems to find its way into the cor-
ridors of donor organizations (McKechnie
2003; Woodward 2002). Linear models of war
to peace transitions are being questioned, which
follows experiences with development coop-
eration.
Change seems to be in urgent need. In the
wider context, UN missions with statebuilding
components have failed more often than not. Of
the 18 countries that experienced UN peace-
keeping missions with a political “institution-
building” component between 1988 and 2002,
thirteen (72%) were classified as some form of
authoritarian regime as of 2002 (Call/Cook
2003). Implementation of the prevalent “demo-
cratic reconstruction model” has proven prob-
lematic to say the least. UNTAES in Eastern
Slavonia is regarded as a success, while the situ-
ation on the ground is far from resolved . Vio-
lence has sparked in Kosovo in spring 2004, and
East Timor is still struggling, even if Chopra’s
(2002) account of UNTAET as “building state
failure” might be too pessimistic.
4. Conclusion
This article has suggested that international
statebuilding ills due to a limited appreciation
of the complexities that such missions entail. It
has offered a definition of the state and the pro-
cess that leads to its making that goes beyond
traditional, and in this opinion, overly simplis-
tic concepts still dominant in statebuilding re-
search and practice. The discussion of institu-
tions and institutional change attempted to elu-
cidate the context in which post-conflict
statebuilding takes place. Some of the recent
experiences from the field have shown that there
is an urgent need for further reflection on cur-
rent approaches in order to realize the promises
they make to the people in whose name they are
being exercised.
International statebuilding is not a technical
affair, but a complex undertaking that impacts
on every aspect of the target society. It is an ef-
fort in social engineering and not impartial as-
sistance for self-help (Paris 1997). The recent
move towards variants of international transi-
tional administration that have included tempo-
rary UN statehood in East Timor give evidence
to a new willingness on part of the international
community to engage in post-conflict societies.
Strong mandates and substantial resources
alone, while important in their own right, do not
determine the fate of a statebuilding mission. It
might be advisable to change our language as
we have seen that the state cannot be built but is
constituted over time, not last in the minds of
its people.
There is need for further research, yet,
equally important, research has to become more
policy relevant. “Standardized packages and
blueprints that are imposed from outside, with-
out regard to the intense political contests of
post-conflict circumstances and to the need for
donors to match resources to their goals, will
fail” (Woodward 2002, 30). It is time to pro-
vide alternatives to the Procrustean Bed of in-
ternational statebuilding. There is a persistent
unwillingness to let go of an ideal model of state
reconstruction by those who think of themselves
as specialists, and a growing tension between
them and realists who recognize the cost and
long term commitment that statebuilding must
imply. Moving away from a focus on outcomes
toward a better understanding of how interna-
tional assistance can stimulate the right proc-
esses that are needed to induce change in peo-
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ple’s minds might be a way to start such a re-
search agenda.
This article has shown that institutional
change and development is a lengthy and com-
plicated process defying quick solutions. It does
not provide an alternative approach to post-con-
flict statebuilding, but it argues that a better un-
derstanding of the actors and structures in post-
conflict situations can provide a map to look
for improvement.
NOTES
1 Goodhand/Hulme (1999, 16f.) define complex po-
litical emergencies as conflicts combining: 1) con-
flict within and across state boundaries; 2) political
origins; 3) protracted duration; 4) social (often
exclusionary) cleavages; 5) predatory social forma-
tions.
2 See Hall/Taylor (1996) for a thorough discussion.
3 “Social structures”/”Institutions” and “agents”/”ac-
tors” are used interchangeably in this study.
4 The challenge is to bring these two assumptions to-
gether in one analytic framework, which constitutes
the “agent-structure problem” (Dessler 1989; Wendt
1987).
5 This discussion adapts Wendt’s (1992, 419-422)
analysis of the replacement of a competitive with a
cooperative international security system to post-
conflict situations.
6 Appropriateness does not have to refer to ‘positive’
norms and values. Exclusionary ideology might
render appropriate hostility, even war.
7 Examples are: inter-organizational coordination,
management, and financing or means-ends (man-
date-procedure) contradictions.
8 Notable scholarly exceptions are (Beauvais 2001;
Bain 2003; Newman 2002).
9 “Governorship” refers to one of the four operational
categories of transitional authority offered by Chopra
(1999, 16), the others are assistance, partnership and
control.
10 In fact there has been an increase in HR decision
making over the years.
11 Consider (Dobbins et al. 2003; UNDP 2004). Re-
garding Kosovo and East Timor some spoke of “in-
vention” (Traub 2000).
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